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Abstract
In this paper, we draw attention to the epistemological assumptions of market liberalism
and standpoint theory and argue that they have more in common than previously
thought. We show that both traditions draw on a similar epistemological bedrock, specif-
ically relating to the fragmentation of knowledge in society and the fact that some of this
knowledge cannot easily be shared between agents. We go on to investigate how market
liberals and standpoint theorists argue with recourse to these similar foundations, and
sometimes diverge, primarily because of normative pre-commitments. One conclusion
we draw from this is that these similarities suggest that market liberals ought to, by
their own epistemological lights, be more attentive towards various problems raised by
feminist standpoint theorists, and feminist standpoint theorists ought to be more open
to various claims made by market liberals.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the similarities between the epistemological assumptions of
market liberalism and standpoint theory. The focus will be the claims that some knowl-
edge is dispersed in society such that only some agents have access to it, and that this
knowledge is hard or impossible to share with others. This is an insight that is shared by
both market liberals and standpoint theorists. In a nutshell, market liberals hold that
individuals have knowledge related to their place and time that is inherently hard to
share and that enables a decentralized market to efficiently allocate resource and sup-
ports productive innovations. The context of this discourse is largely one of knowledge
as it relates to economic endeavors such as regulatory mechanisms, price-setting, or
technological innovation. Standpoint theorists, on the other hand, argue that some per-
sonal characteristics like gender can have a substantive impact on knowledge creation
such that some knowledge is in the hands of only those who share a certain experience
in life, and that this knowledge cannot simply be shared with others. Much of the cur-
rent literature focuses on aspects of the social world, specifically factettes of oppression
and experience. In an attempt to investigate the similarities between these two positions,
the specific features of interest in this paper are (i) the fragmentation of knowledge in
society and (ii) the inability of individuals to share this knowledge directly. In our
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paper, we closely examine the similarities between these two positions by recourse to
the two underlying epistemological features and argue that, despite their political oppo-
sitions, both sides ought to adapt or at least be more attentive to some of the claims of
the respective other. These similarities between market liberalism and standpoint epis-
temology are not yet recognized, even though the general idea of combining the price
mechanism with something like a perspectival analysis was recently, for example, done
by Muldoon (2016) and Gaus (2019) in the context of political theory.1
We structure the paper as follows. In 1.1 and 1.2, we introduce market liberalism and
standpoint theory. Specifically, we motivate this paper by drawing on a Hayekian view
of dispersed knowledge as a foundation for functioning markets and by drawing on a
feminist view of standpoint theory inspired by, for example, Harding and Collins, that
discusses the contexts of gender and race. We then go on to briefly discuss the frequent
political opposition between these two positions. In 2, we make explicit how the epis-
temological commitments of both market liberals and standpoint theorists relate to each
other. Particularly, we highlight where similarities survive contact with the other and
where substantive differences emerge. In 3, we draw together these findings and suggest
a productive path forward for both market liberals and standpoint theorists by recourse
to a number of examples in which we put the above results to work.
1.1. Market Liberalism
In this section, we introduce Market Liberalism and its epistemological assumptions.
We understand market liberalism to be a liberal political theory proposing that society
should be structured according to a market-oriented system and ought to be combined
with a limited and neutral state. The central claim of market liberalism is that a market
economy fosters the ends of a liberal society best.2
In this paper, we put the focus exclusively on one central motivating epistemic argu-
ment for market liberalism: the Knowledge Argument by F.A. Hayek.3 Hayek’s knowl-
edge argument, which went on to directly influence a large number of market liberal
theorists, was initially formulated as an argument against market socialism as conceived
of in the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s (cf. Von Mises 1920; O’Neill 2006;
1In this sense, our project is not wholly novel. This pertains to attempts at outlining accounts of justice in
morally and otherwise heterogeneous societies. For example, Gaus (2019) puts forward a novel theory that
draws directly on irreconcilably diverse perspectives within society that give rise to deep disagreements
(Gaus 2019). Engaged in a similar project, Muldoon (2016) specifically addresses the challenge of judge-
ment aggregation procedures in cases of vastly diverging perspectives. He argues that a price mechanism
“allows agents with different perspectives to engage with each other in a way that doesn’t privilege any
given perspective” (Muldoon 2016: 84). Furthermore, see D’Agostino (1996) on the problem of public jus-
tification in relation to perspectivally diverse agents. Yet, our approach applies to the context of feminist
standpoint theory specifically. Here, the similarities to market liberal epistemology and its implications
are not yet recognized, even though much of recent feminist scholarship on the topics of race and gender
draws on standpoint theoretic methodology.
2Note that this is shared by neoliberals, libertarians, and laissez-faire capitalists more generally, though
there are some theoretical differences (e.g. on the question of the justified role and size of the state).
However, for the purposes of this paper, the reader can understand the use of our concept of MARKET
LIBERALISM as roughly equating to any of the aforementioned political and economic theories without any
loss of understanding.
3Importantly, Hayek’s Knowledge Argument is not the only motivating argument for market liberalism.
However, it has been exceptionally central in both the academic discussions (as evidenced in the main text)
as well as the political implementations. For example, Margaret Thatcher is reported to have held up
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty at a Conservative Party’s policy meeting while proclaiming that “this is
what we believe” (Ranelagh 1991). Similarly, both Ronald Reagan and George Bush cited Hayek approv-
ingly in support of their visions of the world (Evans and Novak 1981: 229).
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Cerovac 2018; Thicke 2018).4 The fundamental point of Hayek’s contribution is the
insight that knowledge is inherently fragmented in society5 and sometimes cannot be
shared between actors. On Hayek’s view, a well-functioning liberal polity must enable
the market mechanism to function freely and uninhibitedly by top-down planning.
This is primarily because the “knowledge of the circumstances of which we must
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed
bits of incomplete … knowledge which all separate individuals possess” (Hayek 1945:
519) and whose individual interactions with each other lead to a spontaneous order
via the price mechanism (Petsoulas 2013; Colin-Jaeger Forthcoming). In Hayek’s
words, the fundamental economic problem of society is a “problem of the utilization
of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality” (Hayek 1945: 520). The only system
that can achieve to properly draw on this wealth (cf. Radnitzky 1992: 224) of dispersed
individual knowledge, the market liberal holds, is a competitive free-market system that
utilizes the price system for aggregation of this knowledge (cf. also Epstein 2005: 205;
Friedman 2013: 277; Colin-Jaeger and Delcey 2020).
This central epistemological insight is translated into two practical claims. First,
Hayek demonstrates that central planning is exceedingly inefficient because knowledge
is dispersed in society (Khalil 2002). In the picture presented by Hayek, as Friedman
(2013: 278) puts it, “central planners would face insuperable epistemic barriers” in
their attempt to plan the economic and regulatory structures of society, primarily
because the knowledge held by individuals throughout society cannot simply be shared
and transmitted to a centralized decision-maker that would then have to act on this
aggregate. Such a challenge, so the claim, would be better solved by a bottom-up system
in which individuals act on their own and, by doing so, further the public good
indirectly.
Second, Hayek points out that the competitive process leads to discovery and utiliza-
tion of knowledge that would otherwise not be achievable (Bento 2014). Specifically,
Hayek argues that it is the competitive market process that enables individuals with
their specific knowledge of time and place to know where to search for innovation
opportunities and how to exploit them. He continues that this ability of the entrepre-
neur to correctly identify conditions ripe for innovation is best able to function when
“the market tells them what kinds of goods and services are demanded, and how
urgently” (Hayek 2002: 13) in a non-distorted manner. As such, the fundamental prob-
lem of “find[ing] out what kinds of material and human productive forces are present”
(Hayek 2002: 19) is again best solved via a decentralized market process.6
4While the Hayekian argument is one advanced against epistocratic government and central planning, its
negative case can also be expanded to “egalitarian deliberative demorac[ies] characterized by large state[s]
and complex decision-making procedures” (Cerovac 2018: 81). Further, the Knowledge Argument is also
understood to be a critique of positivistic neoclassical economic theory and their equilibrium models in
particular (cf. Kiesling 2015: 46–9; Whyte 2019: 11–12). For contemporary empirical tests of Hayek’s thesis,
compare e.g. Schultz and Libman (2015) as well as Huang et al. (2017).
5This knowledge, as O’Driscoll Jr. puts it, is “localized across the population of economic agents”
(O’Driscoll Jr 2016: 337).
6For Potts, the problem of innovation is practically identical to the problem of dispersed knowledge. In
other words, the problem of innovation, being a knowledge problem, is in essence a problem of “finding
combinations of different pieces of knowledge that reveal valuable opportunities on which entrepreneurs
might act” (Potts 2016: 6). Some institutional arrangements are better at drawing on this dispersed knowl-
edge, e.g. bottom-up ventures, while others, more centralized, fail to effectively aggregate that knowledge
and innovate accordingly (Pohl 2017). As Potts points out, this then extends the application of Hayek’s
knowledge problem to contexts of novel information to already present economic systems, as well as to
the “problem of identifying and coordinating distributed knowledge for entrepreneurial discovery of
Episteme 3
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.13
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 51.9.215.233, on 21 Jun 2021 at 11:44:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
The underlying claim of the knowledge argument that motivates both Hayek’s
opposition to central planning and his endorsement of the market process as a discov-
ery tool pertains to the location of knowledge. The main claim is that some knowledge
is necessarily dispersed. Hayek’s original understanding of this knowledge in question
was to describe it as one of the “particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek
1945: 521). For him, it was “with respect to this that practically every individual has
some advantage over all others in that [they] possess … unique information” (Hayek
1945: 521) that others do not and indeed sometimes cannot possess. Consider the ori-
ginal example below.
Assume that somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw
material, say tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been
eliminated. … All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin
they used to consume is now profitably employed elsewhere, and that in conse-
quence they must economize tin … The whole acts as one market, not because
any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual
fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the rele-
vant information is communicated to all. (Hayek 1945: 526)
On Hayek’s view, every person can (and often does) possess some knowledge specific to
their own situation. In the example above, it could be that a craftsman from Inverness
who had received their supply of tin from a mine near Loch Eriboll heard of the col-
lapse of said mine from a trusted friend. Knowing that this means that their supply
of tin will soon dry up, they are forced to switch to producing their craft from another
metal or be willing to pay a higher price as those supplying the tin will signal the reduc-
tion in supply by raising the price. Being confronted with this decision and knowing
that the tin mine near Loch Eriboll will not open in the foreseeable future, they decide
to produce different handicraft to remain profitable.7
For the market liberal, there is one crucial lesson to draw from this based on the first
of Hayek’s insights laid out above: It would be epistemically impossible for a central
planner to order this craftsman from Inverness as well as all other economic actors
whose choices are impacted by that mine collapse to stop using tin for their handicraft
and to respond properly to the change in the economic landscape based on the news of
the mine collapse. This is because a single central planner or even a planning committee
cannot possess all the relevant knowledge that all individuals engaged in this and prox-
imate industries have. That knowledge includes sharable but also difficult to share
knowledge that some individuals possess by virtue of their position in time and
space, and as such, in society. No single person can accumulate all that knowledge
and issue all the relevant orders in response to that. This points to the coordination pro-
blems that Hayek took to be inherent in socialism and is one of the most fundamental
motivating principles of market liberalism.
opportunities” (Potts 2016: 11) for future applications. Empirically, productivity growth (at industry level)
has been found to correlate positively with competition overall, with average innovation (within industries)
and competition found to be standing in an inverted U-relationship, i.e. positively when competition is
comparatively low and negatively when it is comparatively high. (Aghion et al. 2005; cf. also Dutz and
Hayri 1999; Tingvall and Poldahl 2006; Bento 2014).
7As Friedman (2013) points out, for Hayek this fact alone does not yet suffice for whether this crafts-
man’s action is indeed profitable, as this does depend on how “well his interpretation of this local infor-
mation captures realities in the wider economy, since those realities will determine the future price of
the goods he will try to sell” (Friedman 2013: 286). However, this point is orthogonal to the knowledge
question discussed in this paper.
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Even though the argument relating to central planning has received much attention
in the literature (cf. Butos 2003; O’Neill 2006; Caldwell 2008; Whyte 2019), it is not the
main concern of this paper. The relevant take-away for the purposes of this paper is the
epistemological basis for this claim, namely that this craftsman has some specific
knowledge of place and time which other actors in the same economy do not possess
(and indeed cannot possess due to them not sharing location, time, personal experience,
and so on). This craftsman from Northern Scotland (and many like them), so the mar-
ket liberal claims, possesses a certain level of epistemic advantage over other actors
which they then communicate through economic actions and the setting of appropriate
prices as a signal in the economic order.8 This knowledge, as Kiesling (2015) points out,
is “dispersed, private, local, often tacit, frequently inarticulate, sometimes ephemeral,
and usually contextual” (Kiesling 2015: 62).
A second, similarly central claim is that sometimes, knowledge is not only dispersed
in society, but it is also the fact that significant amounts of relevant knowledge simply
cannot be shared between agents. The claim here is that knowledge sometimes cannot
be shared specifically due to the nature of the knowledge in question, which makes us
face an insurmountable “impossibility of conveying” (Oğuz 2010: 146). As Oğuz lays
out, for Hayek and the market liberals following in this tradition, there is knowledge
such that “personal dimension[s] make [it] categorically different” (Oğuz 2010: 147)
from the type of knowledge that can easily be plugged into a cost-benefit analysis
(e.g. one’s preferred wage rate or one’s willingness to pay for a product). What
makes this knowledge so categorically different based on its personal dimensions is
not made fully clear by Hayek (except for the fact that it has something to do with
the personal characteristics of it, and that it is dispositional, such that agents are follow-
ing rules without knowing them).
On some interpretations, one can understand this knowledge as tacit knowledge,
with Hayek frequently drawing on Polanyi (and Ryle) who held that “we can know
more than we can tell” (Polanyi 1966: 4). For example, Hayek describes knowledge
as sometimes being such that we cannot “ever explicitly state or exhaustively describe”
(Hayek 1952: 152) it in a way such that “we always know … more than we can delib-
erately state” (Hayek 1967: 60–1). This “hardly even articulable” (Hayek 1988: 89)
knowledge is essential to the market process and the signaling role of prices, especially
when it comes to innovation. Returning to the topic of innovation to provide an
example, Hayek lays out that “an entrepreneur’s hunch that a new product might be
successful … would prove impossible to [be made] public quite apart from considera-
tions of motivation” to do so (Hayek 1988: 89). This knowledge has a personal dimen-
sion that makes it both impossible to share and integral to the market process. In other
words, “some part of knowledge remains tacit all the time” (Oğuz 2010: 161).9 As such,
significant amounts of knowledge that the market liberal understands as fundamental to
the functioning of a capitalist economy is tacit and personal in such a way that it cannot
be shared between individuals.
In sum, market liberals acknowledge and indeed make central to their theory the
epistemological claim that our knowledge-generating processes are necessarily imper-
fect and often wholly personal, and that only the market is able to properly take into
account and aggregate all the localized, sometimes tacit, knowledge within a society effi-
ciently (cf. Whyte 2019: 11). For market liberals, individual differences in epistemic
access to certain states of affairs are a necessary stepping stone towards explaining
8For how Hayek’s view of dispersed knowledge relates to the notion of bounded rationality, compare
Fiori (2009: especially 273–5).
9This is a common interpretation of Hayek. See, for instance, Vaughn (1994: 122) and Fleetwood (1995: 97).
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how and why market economies with a limited state, largely free-reining markets, and
an unconstrained price mechanism outperform both epistocracies and egalitarian delib-
erative democracies that may lack some of these features, as well as to why such a system
is important for fostering innovation. Further, it is the combination of both the disper-
sion of knowledge and the inability to share other types of knowledge that makes this
system work.10 To summarize, it is integral to the market liberal’s view that individuals
in society have different epistemological advantages over each other. Those advantages,
expressed through the price mechanism, then lead to an efficient allocation of the
resources available in a competitive free-market system that is well-suited for innovation
and discovery. This argument relies on the fundamental claims (i) that knowledge is
dispersed throughout society, (ii) that the position in society (time/place etc.) influences
what knowledge one possesses, (iii) that significant amounts of knowledge (e.g. tacit
knowledge) cannot be articulated or shared, and (iv) that the market process is best suited
at dealing with (i), (ii), and (iii). In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on (i) – (iii).
1.2. Standpoint theory
In this section, we introduce standpoint theory. Standpoint theories are best categorized
as feminist social epistemologies. As such, they are especially concerned with the ana-
lysis of the belief-forming processes of individuals and groups in society as well as the
question of how these processes relate to the formation of knowledge.11 Especially early
feminist epistemology (cf. Code 1981; Harding 1982) aimed at understanding the
impact of gender on knowledge acquisition. Later advocates of standpoint theory
(cf. Collins 1990; Naples 2009) extended this field of research from gender to a variety
of other social identities while retaining the focus on underprivileged social groups, thus
moving towards an intersectional direction (Naples and Gurr 2013).12,13 The epistemo-
logical core thesis of standpoint theorists is that because of one’s perspective and experi-
ence in life, various people have unique knowledge that cannot simply be shared with
others via standard means.
Specifically, standpoint theory investigates the relation between social identities and
knowledge based on the concept of PERSPECTIVAL DIFFERENCES. Perspectival differences
concern the essentially different perspectives individuals or groups can have on a certain
domain of inquiry. First and foremost, this conception of perspectival differences has to
be distinguished from the fairly trivial assessment that different subjects in a society
have different experiences, and thus acquire different items of knowledge. Much
more fundamentally, standpoint theory claims that knowledge is shaped by one’s
own perspective as part of a group to such an extent that it is in principle impossible
for a member of a different group to acquire such knowledge. In other words, some
experiences are such that someone else who cannot access them (because they are
10For a survey of the experimental evidence on information in financial asset prices, compare Page and
Siemroth (2020) to see this assumption tested empirically.
11Commonly used formulations of standpoint theory such as these suggest a reliabilist approach, as
developed by Goldman (1979). This is the prototypical method of justification used in social epistemology,
adopted in standpoint theory, for instance, by Michaelian (2008). Our paper, however, is independent of
any specific epistemological method of justification, such as reliabilism or evidentialism.
12For example, Naples’ (2009) framework incorporates race, gender, class, sexuality, and culture more
generally in analysing the epistemic grounds of distinct intersectional positions in society. For a recent
account of how an intersectional analysis can produce novel insights, compare Al-Ali (2020).
13For an account that argues that feminist empiricism and standpoint theory ought to merge, see
Intemann (2010).
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specific to the experiences of a certain sex, gender, ethnicity, etc.14) cannot gain certain
knowledge related to that experience, even if those holding the knowledge tried to share
it directly. As such, standpoint theory implies a necessary fragmentation of knowledge
in society, a stance that has become known as the Group Fragmentation Thesis.
Group Fragmentation Thesis: Perspectival differences that rest on unique charac-
teristics of group identities generate significant amounts of knowledge for a
group that can in principle not be shared with other groups.
The Group Fragmentation Thesis can be subdivided into two sub-theses. First, the claim
that the uniqueness of the belief-forming processes of members of a group G generates
various justified true beliefs for G that cannot be generated by members outside of
G. Second, the unique nature of the group-specific belief-forming processes prevents
such knowledge to be shared to members outside of G. Note that the Group
Fragmentation Thesis does not imply that the epistemic out-group cannot form the
beliefs of the epistemic in-group (even though this position might be advanced inde-
pendently as well). Instead, it suggests that the justificatory processes of the in-group
are not accessible for the out-group, and since justification is a necessary condition
for knowledge, the epistemic out-group cannot access said knowledge.
As Kukla (2006) showed extensively, this breaks with the widely shared traditional
view of epistemology that epistemic warrant needs objective accessibility. While some
standpoint theorists argue that, thus, standpoint theory is necessarily epistemically rela-
tivist (cf. Ashton 2020), Kukla (2006) maintains that this is still compatible with an
objectivist epistemology, while Haraway (1988) suggests that one should move beyond
the objectivism-relativism dichotomy altogether (cf. also Harding 1992; Hamati-Ataya
2014: 168–70).
One of the most widely discussed disagreements in standpoint theory relevant for
the purposes of our paper is the scope of epistemic significance. Early advocates stress
especially the significance of one’s position in society for understanding social relations.
However, the application of standpoint theory was later extended to a wide variety of
fields of knowledge. One example is the effect of social location on science, be it on
social sciences or natural sciences (cf. Wylie 2003; Crasnow 2013). As Toole (2019)
lays out in detail, standpoint theory originates in the ideas of Karl Marx and Georg
Lukács in the context of the proletarian standpoint. It is argued that the exploited work-
ing class has significant epistemic privilege over the rich and the factory owners because
of their unique position in society – a view foreshadowing contemporary standpoint
theory. Smith (1974) adjusts this proletarian perspective by replacing the class analysis
with a gender analysis. This gender-focused version of the Marxist framework then
became the core of mainstream standpoint theories, for example those advocated for
by Hartsock (1983), Jaggar (1983), or Harding (1991).
Hartsock (1983) emphasizes especially the experiential differences and epistemic
consequences of a socially underprivileged oppressed group compared with an
oppressor group. Following Hartsock (1983), by applying the concept of perspectival
differences to the analysis of dominant and oppressed groups, standpoint theorists,
such as Harding (1991) and Collins (1990), developed the thesis of Bifurcated
Consciousness. Its main claim is that oppressed groups have privileged access to knowl-
edge. The reason for this special epistemic advantage is that only individuals of the
oppressed groups have the ability to see both perspectives by experiencing their
14This may include the experience of being Black in America, of undergoing childbirth, or of being a
woman (and all their possible intersections).
Episteme 7
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.13
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 51.9.215.233, on 21 Jun 2021 at 11:44:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
marginalized situation uniquely.15 The dominant groups, on the other hand, as Mills
(2007) and Tuana (2004, 2006) argue, even have an additional incentive for being
ignorant about their unearned privilege. Rolin (2006, 2009) calls this the Thesis of
Epistemic Advantage. As Harding puts it, standpoint theories “map how a social and
political disadvantage can be turned into an epistemic, scientific and political advan-
tage” (Harding 2004: 7–8).
Note that the early Marxist roots of standpoint theory were already based around an
analysis of the epistemic significance and social location for market interactions which
we will pick up again in this paper at a later point. Notice further that the classical
Marxist perspective interpreted as a proletarian standpoint theory makes it plausible
that the standpoint also plays a significant role not only for the proletariat, but also
for their respective labor occupations. From this more fine-grained perspective, any
proletarian sub-group, such as weavers or construction workers, for example, will
have unique experiences that shape their life-world and give them privileged access
to specific kinds of knowledge, implying the Group Fragmentation Thesis.
In summary, the presented picture of feminist standpoint theory is one in which
both individualistic and group characteristics have a direct influence on knowledge of
such kind that cannot always be shared between individuals.
1.3. On the perceived opposition of feminist theory and Market Liberalism
In this section, we want to clarify the current relationship between (standpoint theor-
etic) feminist theory and capitalist theory with respect to what is often perceived to
be a political opposition. We understand that due to the heterogeneity in both traditions
of thought, any exhaustive overarching account of their interrelations will be necessarily
incomplete. Yet in essence, we draw on the perhaps obvious point that feminist theory
and capitalist theory often stand in a contrapositive relation. In the later sections, we
argue for a degree of bridge-building, given the common epistemological core.
Historically speaking, standpoint theory draws heavily on Marxist theory (cf.
Hekman 1997: 341–2).16 It goes without saying that prima facie, any theory rooted
in Marxism is opposed to market liberalism as outlined above.17,18 Various recent fem-
inist epistemologists, however, criticize the Marxist elements of classical standpoint the-
ory by contending that the Marxist perspective, as Hekman (1997: 341) writes,
“has been discredited in both theory and practice,” and as such ought not to be
given particularly high credence. Thus, scholars such as Hekman (1997) strip stand-
point theory from its materialist essentials and take a postmodern and poststructuralist
perspective instead. What all of these perspectives (i.e. Marxism, postmodernism, and
poststructuralism) have in common, however, is their vehement criticism of capitalism
which thus constitutes, at least in its origins, a fundamental tenet of all main strands of
feminist standpoint theory.
15“Starting off research from women’s lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only of
women’s lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order” (Harding 1993: 56).
16See also, for instance, Rose (1983), Young (1980), O’Brien (1981), or Jaggar (1983).
17Fraser (2012) argues that, early on, feminism posed a substantive challenge to capitalism, though it
then merged into neoliberal capitalism. Today, Fraser claims, feminism is well positioned again to “reinvent
feminist radicalism” (Fraser 2012: 4) in opposition to current capitalism. See also Bargu and Bottici (2017:
7) and Luxton (2014: 137).
18Many of those criticizing capitalism from a socialist feminist perspective draw on Karl Polanyi (1944).
Polanyi, a contemporary of Hayek’s, had clashed multiple times with both Mises and Hayek and is generally
viewed as the socialist counterpart to the Austrian School of Economics. For how Hayek’s and Polanyi’s
account of tacit knowledge interacts with this, compare Oğuz (2010).
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This opposition is not merely historical.19 The underlying claim, shared by the
majority of theorists working in this field, is that the oppression of women in patriarchy
stands in some important relation to capitalism.20 It should be pointed out, however,
that there is also a liberal strand of feminism,21 and thus such an opposition to capit-
alism is not categorical. Still, when it comes to standpoint theory, the factual opposition
is apparent.
On the market liberal side, Epstein (1995), for example, has argued that employment
discrimination laws ought to be rejected on the grounds of them limiting the freedom of
choice, introducing destructive government constraint, and thus mandating inefficient
employment patterns. Similarly, Hayek is often quoted in his opposition to social just-
ice, e.g. by seeing in it a threat that might lead to the “destruction of the indispensable
environment in which the […] value of personal freedom [can flourish]” (Hayek 1976:
67), though whether he exactly meant what is currently understood under the term is
less clear (see Lister 2013). As far as feminism is intertwined with anti-capitalist senti-
ments, this necessarily creates an opposition to market liberalism. However, the feminist
goals per se are frequently shared by market liberals. For example, already in the 1920s
Von Mises (1951) argued that giving women complete economic freedom would be an
important step towards equal treatment under the law and equality more generally. He
states that “[a]ll mankind would suffer if woman should fail to develop her ego and be
unable to unite with man as equal, freeborn companions and comrades” (Mises 1951:
105). Also today, market liberals frequently point out and oppose various sexist limits
the state puts on women’s freedom (cf. Kirp et al. 1986: 204).
Given the evidence presented above, we conclude that feminist theory is frequently
opposed to capitalist thinking, especially in the realm of standpoint theory. On the side
of market liberalism, at least some, like Hayek, were adamantly opposed to some of the
social justice goals of feminist theory (cf. Hayek 1976: 33, 67–8, 80, 97), others share
feminist goals and are merely opposed to frequent anti-capitalist sentiments of feminist
theorist, or anti-capitalist means in pursuit of feminist goals.
2. On similarities, differences, and compatibilities
In this section, we investigate the similarities and differences between standpoint epis-
temology and market liberal epistemology. As shown in section 1.1, the three core struc-
tural features of market liberal epistemology are (i) that knowledge is dispersed, (ii) that
the position in society (time/place etc.) influences what knowledge one possesses, and
(iii) that significant amounts of that knowledge cannot be articulated or shared.
As shown in section 1.2, feminist standpoint theory shares all three of these features.
Like market liberals, standpoint theorists too claim (i) that knowledge is dispersed.
The analysis of perspectival differences explains this by (ii) the position in society, espe-
cially pertaining to features such as sex, gender, and ethnicity. The core feature of the
19We recognize the inherent difficulties in disentangling historical and theoretical oppositions, as both
influence each other substantially. For example, Luxton (2014) distinguishes (historical) political activism
and theoretical advances, though, as Ferguson (2014) points out, one ought to “hesitate to pry these apart
(Ferguson 2014: 161), all the while the counterbalancing tendency to conflate them also threatens theoret-
ical clarity.
20See, for instance, Eisenstein (1979), Mojab (2015), and Bargu and Bottici (2017), on gender domin-
ation, Aulenbacher et al. (2018) and Lyberaki (2011) on unpaid or minimally paid care work of women,
Oksala (2017) on sexual regulation, Lara (2017) on ecological responsibility, Walby (1989: 214–15),
Fuchs (2018), Harvey (2005), and Moore (2015) on the intersections of gender with race and class more
generally, and Walby (2013) on the historical interconnections of these.
21For an overview, see Baehr (2021).
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Group Fragmentation Thesis is identical to (iii), while adding a group dimension as an
explanation to why this is the case. Concerning (iii), both argue for the existence of a
unique type of knowledge – knowledge that is not sharable across society. Since this
type of knowledge is foreign to traditional epistemology, and its advocacy is indeed
quite revolutionary by disconnecting warrant from objective shareability (cf. Kukla
2006), it is by itself already a surprising finding that both, standpoint theory and market
liberal epistemology, share this basic assumption. However, even though the epistemo-
logical core is almost identical, there are also areas of apparent disagreement on various
details of this proposal. Yet on a more careful investigation, many of those disagreements
turn out to be reconcilable. In what follows, we closely compare the epistemological com-
mitments of market liberals and standpoint theorists and ultimately conclude that there
exist a surprising number of basic commonalities and compatibilities.
At face value, it might seem that market liberal epistemologies would be dissimilar to
traditional feminist standpoint theories in that the former endorse an individualistic
framework (Hayek 1945: 519) whereas the latter endorse a group-relative framework,
expressed through the Group Fragmentation Thesis. We now want to suggest a synthesis
by addressing two points. On the one hand, standpoint theorists can and should allow
for an individualist dimension. On the other hand, market liberals can and should
adopt the Group Fragmentation Thesis.
On the first question of the proper point of focus, classical theorists of standpoint
epistemology argue for focusing on the group as being the epistemic focal point from
which the situatedness of individuals emerges (cf. e.g. Wylie 2003). However, it should
be noted that the group level cannot be the sole epistemic basis of perspectival differ-
ences. As Tanesini points out, “if the notion of standpoint is to have any plausibility,
it cannot imply that without exception all those who share a social location must
share a perspective” (Tanesini 2019: 2). She argues further, since one’s standpoint relies
on the evidence, skills, and experience of individuals, standpoint theory should take the
perspective of individuals as epistemically fundamental and the group perspective only
as derivative. This implies an Individualistic Fragmentation Thesis.
Individualistic Fragmentation Thesis: Perspectival differences that rest on unique
characteristics of individuals generate significant amounts of knowledge for an
individual that can in principle not be shared between individuals.
The counter thesis to the individualistic perspective on perspectival differences is espe-
cially prominent in advocates of community models of knowledge (Nelson 1990;
Harding 1993; Potter 1993; Longino 2002). Here, the knowledge of individuals can
in principle not be isolated from the community perspective. Furthermore, also con-
sider Collins (2019) or Medina (2012) who argue for an epistemology of resistance.
They suggest that for people from oppressed groups, the engagement with the group
becomes fundamental in order to share experience about oppression and to organize
resistance. This implies that one cannot separate the fragmentation thesis from the
group perspective, as the group is so fundamental to resist epistemic oppression.
Importantly, if one defends an individualistic aspect in standpoint theory and wants
to account for the significance of individualistic bottom-up perspectival differences for
knowledge, one need not depart as radically from classical standpoint theory as
Tanesini (2019) does. Even if one takes the individual level as the epistemic basis, it
still turns out that, in practice, situated experiences (and with them knowledge) are
far from being evenly distributed across groups. Thus, individuals can still be grouped
according to their proclivity of forming specific clusters of knowledge and those groups
can be analyzed from a feminist social epistemology perspective. In other words, even if
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the individual perspectives ground the epistemic analyses, group-based analyses remain
fully compatible with them.
However, fully giving up the top-down influence of a group identity on the epistemic
standpoint of individuals would amount to giving up standpoint epistemology
altogether. Doing that is also not independently plausible. For instance, as one’s gender
furnishes perspectival differences amongst individuals, one’s gender also gives one
access to specific kinds of knowledge inaccessible to individuals of a different gender.
For example, the experience of giving birth is inaccessible to men generally. Thus,
group characteristics significantly influence what knowledge individuals can achieve.
Consequently, if one finds the Individualistic Fragmentation Thesis plausible, then
one may wish to combine it with the Group Fragmentation Thesis in order to account
for the uniqueness of the belief-forming processes that rely both on unique individual
and unique group characteristics.
Incorporating essentially individualistic and essentially group-related perspectival
differences, the social situatedness of knowledge is on such an account fundamentally
based on an interplay between both levels of analysis, and the epistemic basis can per-
haps best be described as fluctuating between them. Since this interpretation leaves
room for a research program of the knowledge generating belief-forming processes in
society both at an individualistic and a group level, we leave it open for further research
and debate to what degree each factor plays a role. The important takeaway of these
considerations is that significant amounts of knowledge are fragmented in society across
groups and individuals, and are inaccessible to certain other individuals because they do
not share essential relevant characteristics.
Hayek shares his focus on the individual with Tanesini, viewing the unique access to
knowledge on the group level merely as emergent from the differences in knowledge
acquisition of individuals. They both endorse the Individualist Fragmentation Thesis,
which shows a very specific shared epistemological commitment between Hayek’s mar-
ket liberalism and a subset of standpoint theories. On the other hand, one might think
that market liberalism with its focus on individualism cannot endorse that subset of
standpoint theories which put the Group Fragmentation Thesis at the center. This
might especially suggest itself if one combines it with a community model of knowl-
edge, where knowledge of a group is irreducible to the knowledge of individuals.
We now want to argue, however, that market liberal epistemology would actually
benefit from adopting the Group Fragmentation Thesis, if properly put into context,
all the while being compatible with their previous, deeply held epistemological commit-
ments. This would widen the scope of epistemological compatibility between standpoint
theory and market liberalism even further. First, consider fragmentation of knowledge
in general. With the concept of perspectival differences, standpoint theory proposes a
necessary fragmentation of knowledge in society, claiming that some knowledge cannot
be shared across groups in principle. As shown in Hayek’s example of the tin mine, we
argued that for market liberalism some knowledge is such that it is factually fragmented
in society but could be sharable in principle.22 Not everyone can in fact access the infor-
mation of the collapse of the tin mine at the same time, and everyone’s specific position
at that time will impact their further understanding and reaction to that event.
Nonetheless, in principle, this knowledge is sharable. Recall the initial example of the
craftsman and imagine them writing a letter to a guild in Edinburgh in order to
share what they have learned. Such dispersion of knowledge merely arises out of
22Note though that the knowledge conveyed by the price system is typically minimal knowledge, which is
by itself sufficient for social coordination, but not necessarily for further, greater goals. We thank Nathanaël
Colin-Jaeger for pressing this point.
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particular circumstances of time and place. However, we further argued that with
Hayek’s views on tacit knowledge, market liberals also endorse that significant amounts
of knowledge cannot be shared in principle, as in the example of innovation. Thus, at
least an individualistic take on perspectival differences is shared by market liberals.
The difference is merely that market liberals usually do not have an eye on the per-
spectival differences based on group characteristics as standpoint theorists do. However,
this can easily be adopted by the market liberal. In fact, the Group Fragmentation Thesis
will give market liberals an additional crucial explanation of why some knowledge is
fragmented in society. As such, it will strengthen the claims of market liberalism
because it introduces an additional mechanism for an epistemic barrier of sharing
knowledge across society, directly adapted from standpoint theorists. Consequently,
we argue that market liberalism would benefit from incorporating the Group
Fragmentation Thesis. The unique characteristics of group identities create a necessary
fragmentation of knowledge in society and the price mechanism guarantees an efficient
allocation of the resources under these epistemic circumstances. Additionally, for those
standpoint epistemologists who want to advocate for a community model of knowledge,
this will be a factual point of contention with market liberals and their focus on meth-
odological individualism. Note, however, that market liberals are not bound to deny a
community model of knowledge either. Even if the knowledge of individuals cannot be
isolated from the knowledge of the groups they belong to, the main assumption of the
market liberal still holds: Only a competitive market with its price system is able to allo-
cate resources efficiently since knowledge is dispersed – in this case – across groups.
This suggests widespread theoretical compatibility.
We now move to the second apparent incompatibility. Given the thesis of market
coordination based on the price system, it might appear as if the market liberal has
to deny the concept of perspectival differences yet again since it seems as if the price
system makes sharing of fragmented knowledge in fact possible. Standpoint epistemol-
ogy, however, proposes that knowledge based on perspectival differences cannot be
shared across groups. Nevertheless, notice that the market liberals only explicitly stress
that the price mechanism is able to coordinate the individual actors and groups in a
market even though knowledge is dispersed. They do not claim that the price system
makes such knowledge directly sharable (cf. Friedman 2013). After all, market liberals
stress that for a vast amount of goods, no single actor in the economy knows, for
example, how the production from raw materials to the end product even works,
much less how much of which product is demanded where, when, and for how long.
Hayek makes this explicit by claiming that “the people guided by [the market] usually
do not know why they are made to do what they do” (Hayek 1945: 527). The price sys-
tem does then not straightforwardly overcome the epistemic barriers. Rather, it med-
iates it just as it does in more standard cases of knowledge fragmentation. That is,
market liberalism merely proposes a coordination mechanism for agents in a society
with fragmented knowledge in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
Since it does not propose that the price system makes the sharing of fragmented knowl-
edge possible, we argue that it does not deny the thesis of perspectival differences.
A final area of difference which we want to address is the scope of fragmented
knowledge. Market liberals claim that every individual has some epistemic advantage
over others, whereas standpoint theorists especially focus on the epistemic advantage
of oppressed groups over dominant groups, culminating in the thesis of Bifurcated
Consciousness. However, we claim that both claims can complement each other. The
thesis of Bifurcated Consciousness would only collide with market liberal epistemology
if it were viewed as the only mechanism for a fragmentation of knowledge in society.
Then, not every individual or every group would have some epistemic advantage, but
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only oppressed ones would. It is true that standpoint theorists frequently argue
(e.g. Medina 2012; Collins 2019) that one type of epistemic advantage due to perspec-
tival differences is only possible for the oppressed groups since they had to learn how to
fit within the dominant epistemological system, whereas the privileged group does not
have to go through such an adoption process and therefore does not gain such types of
epistemic advantages.
However, there exist further mechanisms for a fragmentation of knowledge and its
unsharability. Standpoint theory focuses on the epistemic advantages of oppressed
groups, especially when it comes to knowledge about their oppression and about
oppressive power structures and relations in society above and beyond what is publicly
known.23 Market liberalism, on the other hand, often focuses on how tacit knowledge is
utilized in the market mechanism. Both focus on different areas where fragmented
knowledge arises in society, but the two perspectives do not stand in contradiction.
Instead, they supplement each other. The thesis of Bifurcated Consciousness will enrich
market liberal theories. It will add one further explanation about why knowledge is dis-
persed in society. Conversely, standpoint epistemology is well equipped to broaden its
application, by adopting the view that all individuals and groups can have various kinds
of epistemic advantages emerging from their specific position, while maintaining that
some type of epistemic advantages can only be had by oppressed groups due to their
experienced struggle.
In sum, we have argued that market liberalism synergizes naturally with the thesis of
Perspectival Differences of standpoint epistemology. Beside the structural epistemo-
logical commonalities of these two positions, (i) dispersed knowledge, (ii) influence
of position, and (iii) unsharability of knowledge, we have identified several apparent
further theoretical conflicts that can be reconciled. First, market liberal epistemology
already endorses the Individualist Fragmentation Thesis and, moreover, would benefit
from adopting the Group Fragmentation Thesis and the thesis of the epistemic advan-
tage of oppressed groups as well. Furthermore, market liberalism does not stand in
opposition to the community model of knowledge. Second, the price mechanism in
a competitive market does not amount to a denial of perspectival differences. Third,
both theories focus on different epistemic advantages which should be viewed as com-
plementary, given that they emerge from their common epistemological core assump-
tions. As such, the areas of fundamental disagreement were identified to be relatively
small, which is rather unexpected.
3. What to make of this?
The finding that the epistemological assumptions of two lines of thought are that simi-
lar even though they are typically viewed as being politically opposed might be at least
somewhat surprising. However, one might also expect some sound epistemological rea-
soning to underlie multiple positions, even politically opposed ones. What makes this
case especially important is that both market liberalism and standpoint theory draw sig-
nificant normative claims directly from their epistemological assumptions. As Whyte
points out in the case of market liberalism, the epistemological claims are “indissociable
from political claims about the good society” (Whyte 2019: 20), in this case understood
to be a “capitalist society” (Whyte 2019: 20). Something similar can be said for stand-
point theories and feminism. An example of this is how the epistemological core
assumptions are used in the discourse on topics such as racism or sexism to argue
23Recently, it has been shown that when groups rely more heavily on public information and less on their
perspectival private views, group forecasts suffer in quantity estimation tasks (Da and Huang 2020).
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how much weight which voices ought to have. As such, the epistemological claims have
a direct pathway to political positions, making the observed epistemological similarities
especially striking. In this section, we explore what these similarities mean for the pro-
jects of feminist standpoint theory, market liberal epistemology, and their respective
political implications. In broad terms, we suggest that (i) market liberals ought to be
more attentive to theoretical findings based on standpoint theoretic methodology in
areas such as gender and racial oppression, as these claims are, at least in part, justified
by epistemological commitments that the market liberals themselves endorse.
Conversely, (ii) we argue that feminist scholars ought to be more open to market liberal
arguments based on one’s position in society on similar grounds.
As established before, the relationship between feminist thought and capitalist
thought is frequently contentious in both theory and politics. However, we claim that
market liberals ought to be more open to accepting and incorporating feminist thinking
into their theorizing based on sharing a vast body of epistemological bedrock. More
specifically, relying on the epistemic claims that knowledge is decentralized in society
only when arguing for the efficient allocation of resources in the market system is
unjustified if, at the same time, conclusions arrived via a markedly similar mechanism
are discounted. As such, we claim, market liberals, to stay consistent with their theor-
etical commitments, should be more open to feminist findings in areas such as how one
would come to know the disproportionate effects of capitalist systems on women and
oppressed minorities. This would also help address a certain level of blindness that vari-
ous market liberals have expressed when it comes to these types of feminist concerns.
Vice versa, we argue that feminists should consider arguments of market liberals
more carefully as well. For the same reason as expounded above, the epistemological
similarities grounding the arguments ought to give feminists reason for a deeper
engagement with some aspects of market liberal thought. For instance, it might be
worth to consider anti-discriminatory market-mechanisms and how an interference
with them might lead to more, instead of less, discrimination (cf. Sowell 2015: 209–
15). More specifically, given the thesis of Bifurcated Consciousness, it could be worth-
while to explore whether the epistemic advantages of an oppressed group could be
turned into an advantage for that group in a more laissez-faire market. After all, stand-
point theorists argue for a significant knowledge advantage of oppressed groups and
market liberals argue that many knowledge advantages, ceteris paribus, pay off in the
market. If this were the case, it would suggest that the cause of some structural oppres-
sion of marginalized groups is at least partly caused by an impediment of a laissez-faire
handling of the economy rather than aided by it. However, notice as well that such an
appreciation will have to take place within the boundaries that further feminist commit-
ments set.
To see this proposal in action, consider the following example of innovation.
Innovation is a topic discussed by market liberals in the context of the value of com-
petitive and free markets (cf. Pohl 2017). For Hayek, the ability to come up with
novel technologies and applications is fostered by a free market that allows non-
distorted communication about “what kinds of goods and services are demanded,
and how urgently” (Hayek 2002: 13). On the market liberal’s view, in conditions of dis-
persed knowledge, innovation is only properly possible if the fitting institutional
arrangements, i.e. decentralized ones, are in place. For the entrepreneur in a free-market
system who seeks to produce a new tool for, say, land fertilization, is best positioned to
draw on their own knowledge of time and place in the context of prices. Unconstrained
by a regulator, this entrepreneur is better able to innovate, fail, and try again until they
produce a novel piece of technology that has the potential to be as much a boon to
everybody’s well-being as the fridge, modern medicine, or automated factories were.
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For the market liberal, as such, there should be minimal regulation to foster maximal
innovation.
While feminists, in contrast, do not use the term “innovation” to describe much of their
political work, one may reasonably understand feminists to be engaged in linguistic and
conceptual innovation. Here, especially the introduction of new pronouns comes to
mind.24 For instance, for those who identify as gender non-binary, the traditional set of
pronouns seems to be insufficient. The degree and kind of insufficiencies and their respect-
ive challenges are in turn best understood by those who identify as gender non-binary and
experience a society with a binary pronoun landscape themselves. Importantly, this innov-
ation would also be inhibited if conceptual innovation was regulated by others who do not
have the same knowledge. In other words, successful feminist innovations are driven by
the knowledge that theorists and lay people have in virtue of their position in society.25
These linguistic innovations can then be put into action to, for example, address injustices,
whereas heavy-handed control would impede these developments.
What we want to point out is that this line of reasoning is structurally very similar to
market liberal reasoning and their way of understanding innovation in the commercial
sector. Both, standpoint theorists and market liberals, understand that the ultimate driver
for successful innovation is dispersed knowledge held by individuals by virtue of who they
are. As such, successful innovation, be it commercial or conceptual/linguistic, cannot sim-
ply be brought into existence by a top-down decree, if it involves fragmented knowledge.
Rather, it has to be driven by those who, for example, experience a certain type of oppres-
sion or experience certain shortcomings of current market solutions themselves. On this
point both market liberals and standpoint theorists reason analogously and, absent any
normative pre-commitments, ought to be open to the other’s reasoning and conclusions
on the basis of it being arrived at by such a similar mechanism.
Consider now a second example in which we present a case where the shared epis-
temology of standpoint theorists and market liberals suggests political synergies. This
example concerns both (i) the case of shared normative commitments as well as (ii)
the case of diverging normative commitments.
Let us start with (i). For such cases, the structural similarities of market liberal epis-
temology and standpoint epistemology are especially noteworthy because it suggests
employing similar means for their common goals. Consider the goal of addressing pov-
erty and income inequality, focusing on poverty first. This is a prime example of a soci-
etal issue dear to feminist theorizing, especially when it comes to oppressed groups who
suffer disproportionately from it. It is also a normative commitment they share with
various market liberals.26 In fact, Hayek (1944) himself advocates for a government-
based social safety-net in order to address, amongst other things, poverty. We can
thus identify a normative commitment that feminist standpoint theorists share with
various market liberals. What policy proposals would then emerge from their shared
epistemological foundation? Given the argument that individuals and groups that are
themselves affected by poverty and income inequality have unique knowledge and a
unique standpoint and are thus better equipped in finding policy solutions compared
with a distant centralized authority, decentralized solutions should be prima facie
24Another example would be the conceptual framework of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007).
25Feminist insights have also directly contributed to academic innovations by providing new conceptual
schema through which analysis can be enriched, for example in the disciplines of philosophy (Mackenzie
2019) or political science (Weldon 2019).
26For a rights-based version, see for instance, Tomasi (2012) who views economic liberties as fundamen-
tal, while still allowing for some restrictions of these liberties based on social justice. For a synergetic view of
economic freedom and equality, see Otsuka (2003).
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preferred to versions of a centrally planned social safety net.27 The idea is, as Tebble
argues, that “the state should on epistemological grounds devolve the discovery and
implementation of appropriate responses to poverty and economic inequality to indivi-
duals and voluntary associations of them” (Tebble 2009: 601).
Here, market liberals and standpoint theorists have an epistemological motivation to
realize the benefits of a certain form of decentralization for poverty reduction.
Particularly, they can work out policy solutions that pertain directly to the
Fragmentation Thesis by capitalizing on the epistemic advantages that people affected
by economic inequality and poverty have over bureaucratic state entities. Bringing mar-
ket liberals and standpoint theorists together and building on these epistemic advan-
tages promises policies that are both market-friendly while particularly keeping the
needs of oppressed and marginalized groups in focus.28
Now let us move to the second version of this case (ii) in which some normative
pre-commitments diverge. Take the example of addressing poverty and income inequal-
ity again, focusing primarily on income inequality. Frequently, libertarians (cf. Nozick
1974) equate state-planned redistribution with forced labor as a consequence of their
concept of full self-ownership.29 As such, their normative commitment to full self-
ownership overrules any possibility of state-planned redistribution. They might not
even view the reduction of income inequality as an issue at all, as long as it is merely
a consequence of individuals exchanging rightfully acquired goods freely.
Consequently, they will not agree with market liberals, such as Hayek, or various stand-
point theorists on any government-based wealth redistribution program, since for them,
this is an ethical non-starter.
Now interestingly, as shown in the firsts case, the shared epistemological core of
market liberals and feminist standpoint theorists should motivate them to capitalize
on epistemic advantages leading to bottom-up solutions. This in turn, at least for
some of such proposals, will fall in line even with full self-ownership libertarians.
That being said, the case also demonstrates that normative commitments might some-
times make their views diverge. Even an epistemologically informed bottom-up process
might still necessitate some level of state intervention to fully address the challenges of
poverty. A market liberal, such as Hayek, and most standpoint theorists would agree
with such a solution, whereas libertarians in Nozick’s spirit would not, and the reason
is only the difference of normative commitments: How much weight is put on the value
of poverty reduction and how much on the value of full self-ownership. Still, the shared
epistemology promises a shared basis, and thus a more fruitful discussions on which
trade-offs between various normative commitments, such as a commitment to various
kinds of equality, social justice, or self-ownership, can be discussed. The examples dis-
cussed above show both the merits of bringing standpoint theory and market liberalism
27It is striking that Hayek’s proposal of a centralized social safety net is at odds with his argument of
dispersed knowledge. As Tebble (2009) recognizes, a decentralized solution would have been more consist-
ent with his views.
28The literature on the relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction has been generally
mixed (Von Braun and Grote 2002; Faguet and Pöschl 2015; Casey 2018), finding strong heterogeneity in
effect sizes and effect directions that might be due to factors such as pre-existing government functionality
(Jütting et al. 2004), institutional history (Schragger 2010), and others (Connerley et al. 2010). For further
specific country-level data on the Philippines (Bird and Rodriguez 1999; Canare and Francisco 2019),
Uganda (Francis and James 2003; Green 2015), India (Kalirajan and Otsuka 2012), Ghana (Crawford
2008; Agyemang-Duah et al. 2018), China (Wei 2001; Thun 2004; Wu et al. 2020), Malawi (Chinsinga
2008), Turkey (Tosun and Yilmaz 2010), Burkina Faso (Donnelly-Roark et al. 2001), Vietnam (Rao
et al. 1998), or Indonesia (Nursini 2019; Talitha et al. 2020) see the above.
29As a contraposition, see Otsuka’s (2003) left-libertarianism.
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together while also pointing out possible divergences on the basis of normative pre-
commitments that supersede analogous reasoning on the basis of similar epistemo-
logical assumptions.
However, as we have seen at the examples discussed above, both points of view can
potentially benefit theoretically and practically by considering some parts of the other’s
view more seriously. Both sides already draw significant normative consequences from
their epistemological commitments. Thus, because of their common epistemological
bedrock, they have reason to engage with the other’s findings more charitably, however
politically opposed they may be.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined how market liberalism and feminist standpoint theories
surprisingly share deep epistemological features pertaining to the individual’s position
in society with relation to knowledge acquisition and transmission. Furthermore, we
argued that apparent theoretical incompatibilities are to a large extent reconcilable,
and thus it is possible to find common ground between standpoint theorists and market
liberals, even though they are often politically opposed to each other. Given that both
sides draw significant normative claims from their respective epistemological founda-
tions, we have suggested further that despite their political opposition, market liberals
and standpoint theorists ought to engage deeper with the respective other’s views and
potentially build on their common ground. Moreover, we have claimed that proponents
of either side would benefit by incorporating various insights of the other for their
school of thought, especially when it comes to different contexts that their original the-
ory does not typically cover. At least, if they view each other as politically opposed, they
have to justify why such a similar epistemological bedrock that connects closely to their
overarching theory could directly imply their own respective normative commitments
but not the commitments of the other.30
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